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ABSTRACT 
Kiing's case for the relevance of Christianity and his program for 
dialogue with other religions include claims for the exclusive un-
iqueness and normativity of Christ This article raises the following 
questions: (1) Are such claims necessary for personal commitment to 
Christ and for fidelity to the New Testament witness? (2) Do they 
allow for genuine dialogue with other religions? (3) Are they even 
possible in the light of prevalent norms for theological and 
historical-critical methodology? 
A Fundamental Question 
Any consideration of Hans Kiing's attitude towards world religions 
must begin with the "direct question" with which he opens his book: 
"Why be a Christian?"1 Naturally, the whole book is his response. But 
already on the first page of the main text a central ingredient in that 
response is clearly stated. Küng feels that to make an intelligent choice to 
be a Christian, a person must be able to affirm, reasonably argue, and 
claim before the world that "compared with the world religions and 
humanisms . . . Christianity [is] something essentially different, really 
something special" (p. 25). As Daniel Donovan states: "The whole book 
is structured around the concepts of 'difference* and 'uniqueness.' "2 
And as becomes clear in the section on Christology, the rock-foundation 
for this difference and uniqueness is the Christian claim that Jesus of 
Nazareth is "ultimately decisive, definitive, archetypal3 for man's rela-
tions with God, with his fellow man, with society" (p. 123). 
lOn Being a Chrìstian, tr. Edward Quinn (New York: Doubleday, 1976), p. 25. All 
further page references will be found in the text. 
2
 "Küng and Kasper on Christ," The Ecumenist 15 (1977), p. 18. 
3The German word is "massgebend," better translated as "normative." 
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These quotations, as well as the entire book, make clear just how 
Küng understands the concepts of "unique" and "different": not simply 
in the sense that every individual and every religion is different and 
therefore unique; rather, "unique" means: surpassing all others, one and 
only, superior, absolutely and universally normative for others, defini-
tive. He clearly argues that Jesus is ultimately archetypal, and so is not 
just one of the many "archetypal men" that Karl Jaspers has identified 
throughout history (p. 124).4 Therefore, to make an intelligent responsi-
ble choice for Christianity, according to Küng, means to claim such 
uniqueness for Christ and for Christianity. 
As a theologian and as a Christian, I feel the need to question such a 
viewpoint. This raises an issue which, in our age of pluralism, confronts 
Christian theology as never before: the validity of claiming uniqueness 
for Christ over other religious figures and for Christianity over other 
religions.5 That this issue is painfully pricking Christian sensitivity is 
evident from theological discussions and literature over the past years.6 
The following reflections on Küng's understanding of the finality of 
Jesus and world religion are presented in the form of three theses; or 
4Küng's understanding of the uniqueness of Jesus can also be stated in terms of the 
familiar distinction between "inclusive" and "exclusive" Christologies. (For a succinct 
statement of this distinction, cf., David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism 
in Theology (New York: Seabury, 1975), pp. 206-207. To claim that Küng's view of Jesus' 
uniqueness grounds an inclusive Christology is correct but inadequate. True, such a view 
allows for and includes the positive, even salvine content of other revelations. However, it 
clearly excludes the possibility of there being other revelations equal to that of Christ and 
insists that all other religions and religious figures need to be judged and completed by 
Christ. It is this α priori exclusivist content of Küng's Christology which I am questioning. 
Or, as Monika Hellwig put it: "Given... [our] contemporary experience, it would seem 
that theologians must now ask themselves: can there be a non-exclusivist Christology, i.e., 
one which does not make unmatchable, unsurpassable claims for Jesus?" "Seminaron 
Christology: Exclusivist Claims and the Conflict of Faiths," in Luke Salm (ed.), CTSA 
Proceedings 1976, p. 130. Cf., also D. T. Niles, "The Christian Claim for the Finality of 
Christ," in Dow Kirkpatrick (ed.), The Finality of Christ (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1966), 
pp. 13-31. 
5
 This does not imply that such traditional claims for uniqueness apply in the same way 
to Christianity as to Christ. As the neo-orthodox theologians and Paul Tillich remind us, a 
clear distinction must be maintained between Christ and Christianity. Yet despite Tillich's 
insistence to the contrary, any claim for the exclusive uniqueness and normativity of Christ 
leads, willy-nilly, to similar claims for the religion that has originated from him. Cf. Paul 
Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1963), pp. 79-97. 
6It was a quite controversial issue at the last two meetings of the Catholic Theological 
Society of America; cf., Monika Hellwig, The Christian Claim, pp. 129-132 in footnote 4. 
The following is an excellent summary of clashing viewpoints concerning the finality and 
normativity of Christ: Peter Schineller, "Christ and Church: A Spectrum of Views," 
Theological Studies 37 (1976), pp. 545-566. This issue also makes up the substance of 
John B. Cobb, Jr.'s Christ in α Pluralistic Age (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1975). From the 
perspective of dialogue with Judaism, it is presented quite radically in Michael Brett 
McGarry, Christology After Auschwitz (New York: Paulist, 1977). Finally, it is the eye of 
the storm raging over the recent publication of The Myth of God incarnate, ed. John Hick 
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1977); cf., also The Truth of God Incarnate, ed. Michael Green 
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1977). 
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better, I should call them hypotheses. They are tentative and need 
further scholarly examination. Given the limitations of a short article, I 
can state them only schematically, frequently merely referring to data 
which I feel substantiates them. 
Therefore I propose that the claim that Christ and Christianity are 
unique in the sense understood by Küng is: (1) not necessary for Chris-
tian identity and living, (2) not conducive to genuine dialogue with 
other religions, and (3) not possible according to the norms of theologi-
cal and historical-critical method. 
Í. Claims of Uniqueness Not Necessary for 
Christian identity and Living 
A. Such Claims are not Necessary for Commitment to Christ 
This statement contradicts common Christian attitudes and convic-
tions. On the popular as well as the academic level, it is taken for granted 
that to be fully committed to Christ, he must be the one and only, or at 
least the definitive and therefore the best Savior and Revealer. Yet today 
we are forced to ask: is this really so? Intellectually and psychologically, 
is it not possible to give oneself over wholly to the meaning and message 
of Jesus and at the same time recognize the possibility that other 
"saviors" have carried out the same function for other people? Is it not 
consistent, as John Macquarrie claims, to be fully committed to Christ 
and at the same time fully open to the salvific significance of other 
religions?7 This does not imply simplistically to water down the content 
of the Christ event and proclaim that all religious leaders are "talking 
about the same thing." Differences, and therefore uniqueness, are main-
tained. And thus the universal significance of Jesus is preserved; the 
difference he makes is felt by Christians to be vitally important for all 
religions. Yet while holding to this, the Christian can also, I feel, be open 
to recognize the "vitally important difference" of, for instance, Buddha. 
B. Such Claims are not Necessary for Fidelity to Christian Tradition 
Fine, some may respond, but what do we do with the fact that such 
claims for the uniqueness of Christ have been made by Christian tradi-
tion, especially in its originating testimony, the New Testament? And 
Christianity understands itself as a religion grounded in history, there-
fore bound by fidelity to its past. 
A reply to this plunges us into the complexities of the hermeneutical 
question. Recognizing this, I suggest that especially in the light of recent 
hermeneutical studies, it can be argued that the claim for Jesus' exclu-
sive uniqueness does not form part of the central assertions of Christian 
'Principles of Christian Theology (London: SCM, 1966), pp. 155-158. 
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texts, i.e., of what David Tracy, with Paul Ricoeur, calls the "referent" of 
the text, its suggested "mode-of-being-in-the-world."8 More precisely, 
while these texts of the New Testament do claim that it is in Jesus of 
Nazareth that this new mode-of-being-in-the-world is revealed (and this 
is part of their central assertion), the further claim that this takes place 
only in him can be said to result from the historically conditioned world 
view and thought-patterns of the time. Therefore these latter claims do 
not belong to the core of the Christian message. 
To substantiate this assertion properly would move us beyond the 
limits of these reflections. I can only summarize some arguments which, 
at the moment, appear to me to demand serious consideration. 
(a) Given the prevailing Jewish eschatological-apocalyptic mental-
ity, it was natural that the early Christians should interpret their experi-
ence of God in Jesus as final and unsurpassable. Their particular 
philosophy of history was such that they expected a new and definitive 
stage; also, it was a stage that was to break forth on the world only from 
Jerusalem. So when they encountered the overpowering presence of 
Jahweh in Jesus, the spontaneous conclusion was that this stage had 
arrived. Furthermore, since at least in the early New Testament writings, 
the end of history was thought to be immanent, possibilities of other 
revelations or prophets were simply beyond one's consideration. Is not 
such an apocalyptic mentality, understood in the literal sense, culturally 
limited? Must it be taken as part of the essence of the Christ-event? If 
Jesus had been experienced and interpreted in another philosophy of 
history, e.g., that of India, would he have been said to be final and 
unique?9 
(b) As many scholars (as we shall see, Küng is among them) contend, 
the idea of incarnation was one of the many mythical patterns with 
which the first Christians tried to articulate the meaning Jesus had for 
them.10 Again, we can point out that absolutist claims were a part of this 
mythical thinking. Jesus, as the incarnation of preexisting divine Wis-
dom or Logos y was thought to be absolutely unique among all humans. 
But we can and must ask: if we take this myth not literally but seriously, 
are such absolutist claims intrinsic to its meaning? Maurice Wiles poses 
8Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, pp. 72-79, 131-136. 
"For a more extensive presentation of this argument, cf., Don Cupitt, "The Finality of 
Christ," Theology 78 (1975), pp. 618-622; Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, in 
footnote 7); id., "Christianity and Other Faiths," Union Seminary Quarterly Review 20 
(1964), pp. 39-48; John Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1973), pp. 108-119. 
10
 For interpretations of the myth of incarnation and its implications for the finality of 
Christ, cf., Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths, in footnote 9), pp. 148-179; Frances 
Young, "A Cloud of Witnesses" and Two Roots or a Tangled Mess?," The Myth of God 
Incarnate, pp. 13-47, 87-121; Maurice Wiles, "Myth in Theology," The Myth of God 
Incarnate, pp. 148-166; Seely Beggiani, "Mythological and Ontological Elements in Early 
Christology," in Thomas M. McFadden (ed.), Does Jesus Make a Difference? (New York: 
Seabury, 1974), pp. 20-43. 
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the provocative question: just as we have gone through the painful but 
meaningful process of remythologizing the "special," one-time, one-
man character of the First Adam in the Creation-and-Fall myth, should 
we not do the same for the Second Adam in the Incarnation myth?11 
(c) Gregory Baum offers another consideration to explain the histor­
ically conditioned character of the early church's absolutist language. "I 
propose that the exclusivist claims of the New Testament, and the 
proclamation of the early church that apart from its message there is no 
salvation, were survival language."12 By this he means that given the 
historical context in which the communities had to "close ranks" in the 
face of so much opposition, it was natural for them to speak of Jesus and 
his "way" as unique. But given an age in which survival is much more 
secure and relations with other religions are not those of opposition and 
syncretism but cooperation and dialogue, cannot the meaning of Jesus be 
articulated without such exclusivist survival language? 
(d) A much more general line of argument is based on Bernard 
Lonergan's distinction between classicist and modern-historical cul­
tures. Pointing out that culture provides the "beliefs" or general outlook 
(P. Berger would use the term "plausibility structures") with which 
people interpret their world, Lonergan describes the radical differences 
between the beliefs of classicist and modern cultures. The classicist 
outlook, which for the most part characterized the world of the New 
Testament and Western civilization until the Enlightenment, took for 
granted that truth could be only one, unchanging, and therefore norma­
tive for all. Our modern-historical consciousness, on the other hand, has 
become aware that all statements of truth are in process, subject to many 
expressions, and therefore never normative in a once-and-for-all sense.13 
The New Testament writers, therefore, as men of their age, naturally 
spoke of Jesus in a once-and-for-all, exclusivistic manner. But do these 
one-and-only claims pertain to the core-content of their message? Can 
we not speak of the vitally important meaning of Jesus according to the 
mentality of our historical consciousness? 
In light of these sketchy considerations on New Testament interpre­
tation, I feel that we can. The heart of the New Testament witness is that 
in Jesus men and women encountered the fullness of God and thus 
experienced "a complete and true manifestation of the fundamental 
""Does Christology Rest on a Mistake?" Christ, Faith, and History, ed. Sykes and 
Clayton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 3-34. This question will be 
taken up more fully below. 
12
 "Is There a Missionary Message?" Mission Trends No. 1, eds. Anderson and Stransky 
(New York: Paulist, 1974), p. 84. (Emphasis mine.) 
"Bernard Lonergan, "Belief Today," Schema ΧΠΙ1 (1970), 9-15; id., "Theology in Its 
New Context," Theology of Renewal, vol. I, ed. L. K. Shook (New York, 1968), pp. 34-46; 
id., "The Transition from a Classicist World View to Historical Mindedness," in J. Biechler 
(ed.), The Role of Law in the Church Today (Baltimore, 1967), pp. 126-133; id., Method in 
Theology (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972), pp. 300-302,326-329. Also Peter Berger, The 
Sacred Canopy (Carden City: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 45-51. 
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meaning of authentic human existence."14 This message can be main-
tained without insistence that he is the only such manifestation. 
ÍÍ. Claims of Uniqueness not Conducive to 
Dialogue with Religions 
This "hypothesis" holds that even though one may be animated by a 
sincere desire to dialogue with people of other faiths, if one meets them 
with the kind of claims for the uniqueness of Christ which Küng feels he 
must make, that dialogue will be essentially hamstrung. This is not to 
say that one should not bring to dialogue clear positions and prejudg-
ments; not only are such prejudgments unavoidable, they are necessary 
for effective exchange. But if Küng's insistence on the finality of Christ is 
one of these clear positions, the dialogue will go nowhere. His chapter 
on the World Religions is, I feel, an illustration of this. 
A. Dialogue Hindered by Preliminary Assumptions 
Elaborating on key ideas in a paper he prepared for a conference 
sponsored by the 38th International Eucharistie Congress in Bombay, 
1964,15 Küng urgently calls for a more positive Christian attitude to-
wards other religions. Such an attitude is indispensable in an age when 
4Tor the first time in world history, it is impossible today for any one 
religion to exist in splendid isolation and ignore the others" (p. 89). And 
Küng vigorously argues for the removal of what he feels are doctrinal 
obstacles to dialogue: the teaching on "No Salvation Outside the 
Church," reinterpreted as the theory of "anonymous Christianity." He 
calls this theory a "theological fabrication" (John Hick terms it an 
"epicycle")16 which both waters down the concept of the church and 
proves to be an insult to members of other religions (pp. 97-98). Further, 
he chides theologians for reaching theological conclusions "without a 
closer knowledge and analysis of the real world of religions" (p. 99). And 
Küng shows that he has tried to do his own analysis in a concrete, if 
abbreviated, description of what he calls the "wealth" of individual 
world religions (pp. 91-96). 
Yet even before this analysis, it seems that Küng has set up his own 
theological α prions which cannot be contested; all of them stem from 
the basic α priori that Christ is the final norm for all religions. He takes for 
granted that the other religions are ways of salvation "only in a relative 
sense, not simply as a whole and in every sense" (p. 104). (Must not the 
very same thing be said of Christianity?) He holds that Christianity must 
claim "absolute validity" and still be "ready to revise its own 
14Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, p. 223. 
IS
 "The World Religions in God's Plan of Salvation," Christian Revelation and World 
Religions, ed. Joseph Neuner (London: Bums & Oates, 1965), pp. 25-66. 
,6God and the Universe of Faiths, pp. 122-130. 
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standpoint" (p. 114). (Doesn't absolute validity place radical limits on 
any revision?) Also, as an attempt to steer a middle path between the 
exclusivism of Barth and the syncretism of Toynbee, he maintains that 
Christianity see itself as a "critical catalyst and crystallization point" for 
other religions (p. 112). This seems to boil down to the "Fulfillment 
Approach" of mainline Protestant theology represented by Hendrik 
Kraemer, Emil Brunner, Paul Althaus.17 This approach would state: 
"While other religions have something of value, they can truly know it 
only by becoming Christian." And so, ¿ifter Küng reviews the positive 
elements in other religions, he adds that all this can".. .be brought to its 
full realization in Christianity" (p. 113). ".. .that God may not remain for 
them (non-Christians) the unknown God, there is needed the Christian 
proclamation and mission announcing Jesus .. ." (p. 447). 
Now all this may be true. Christianity may be true. Christianity may 
be the fulfillment crystallization point for all religions. But this can be 
known and asserted by non-Christians and Christians only after genuine 
dialogue. Therefore Jürgen Moltmann is correct, I feel, when he takes to 
task such views as Küng's notion of "critical catalyst": they "... are still 
not based on dialogue since they proceed from the Christian monologue, 
not from the dialogue itself. They all formulate the Christian position 
before the entry into dialogue. They do not formulate it in the context of 
dialogue."18 As John Macquarrie reasons, this is to destroy dialogue: "A 
creative dialogue is possible only if there is complete openness, and no 
preliminary assumption that one revelation . . . must be the yardstick for 
all others."19 
B. A Blurred View of Other Religions 
Because of his "preliminary assumption" Küng's analysis of the 
religions is in many respects blurred. To a Buddhist or Hindu, or to 
someone who has tried to "pass over" to their religious experiences (like 
Thomas Merton, Raymond Panikkar, John Dunne), Küng's treatment of 
their teachings frequently seems to be insensitive and/or incorrect, and 
his evaluations somewhat too facile. One indication that he should have 
done more thorough study before formulating his evaluations is his 
glaring mistake, repeated four times, of confusing the dualistic Samkhya 
school of philosophy (traced back to the seventh century B.C.) with the 
nondualistic Advaita school of Shankara (eighth century A.D.) (cf., pp. 
17
 Paul Knitter, Towards a Protestant Theology of Religions (Marburg: N. G. El wert, 
1974). Id., "European Protestant and Catholic Approaches to the World Religions: Com-
plements and Contrasts," Journal of Ecumenical Studies 12 (1975), pp. 13-28. Hendrik 
Kraemer, Religion and the Christian Faith (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1956). Emil Brun-
ner, Christusbotschaft im Kampf mit den Religionen (Stuttgart, 1931). Paul Althaus, Die 
Christliche Wahrheit (Gütersloh, Gütersloher Verlaghaus, 1966), pp. 130-147. 
l
*The Church in the Power of the Spirit (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 159. 
19
"Christianity and Other Faiths" [cf. footnote 9), pp. 43-44. 
158 HORIZONS 
93, 108, 115, 301). Other examples: to brand the Hindu experience of 
maya as a declaration of the world's unreality (p. 108) misses the intent 
of this doctrine to point out the deeper, hidden meaning of the finite; and 
to conclude that maya leads to "cosmic pessimism" or "supreme indif-
ference toward the social needs of men" among Buddhists is to leave out 
of consideration Mahayana's affirmation of the world of samsara as well 
as Buddha's doctrine of karuna, universal compassion. To accuse the 
Eastern "cyclical world picture" of predeterminism (p. 107) forgets the 
Hindu invitation to all to use free will in order to do something about 
their karma; such a world picture is no more predetermined than the 
Christian insistence that history is moving towards the parousia. Küng's 
rather disparaging references to "the grimacing gods of Bali" and the 
Phallus (p. 102) do not even allow the possibility that these symbols 
might be as religiously effective as the often grimacing aspect of the 
crucifix. 
More generally, one of the criteria (besides the normativity of Chris-
tianity) which Küng uses in his evaluation of the religions is 
"modernity"—the secularization resulting from modern science and 
technology (p. 106). True, Eastern religions do have to adapt to our 
"modern industrial society" (p. 110), just as Christianity, renegingly, 
had to. Yet, again, Küng's acceptance of the achievements of modernity 
seems too facile; he might also have pointed out the limit-situations 
which our growth-oriented technological society have created—prob-
lems to which Eastern religions, with their emphasis on interiority and 
seeing-through-the-material [maya!)f might speak more meaningfully 
than Christianity can. 
Such instances of imprecision might have been avoided, I feel, if 
Küng were not so certain about his "preliminary assumption" that Christ 
and Christianity are normative for all other religions. 
Similar imprécisions are evident when Küng turns from pointing out 
the deficiencies in the religions to concluding explicitly to Christianity's 
superiority. His arguments do clarify areas in which other religions can 
and should criticize and "fulfill" themselves through dialogue with 
Christianity. Yet none of these arguments indicate finality or absolute 
normativity for Christian revelation, for in each of these areas it can also 
be shown how Christianity can and should learn from the religions. 
Mutual dialogue and mutual self-fulfillment are required. 
For instance, it is true that Eastern religions are called upon by 
Christianity to elaborate more "scientific theologies" (p. 105). Yet on 
this same point, a Buddhist or Hindu would remind the Christian scien-
tist that his theological speculations must be based on personal experi-
ence of the Transcendent (what Bernard Lonergan in his Method of 
Theology calls "Foundations" or "religious conversion").20 Also, one 
"Method in Theology, pp. 267-270, 104-107. 
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must object to Küng's sweeping conclusion that the messages of the 
"great individual [religious] figures cannot be interchanged" insofar as 
Buddha called for "world annulment," Confucious for "world becom-
ing," Muhammad for "world dominion," while Jesus announced "world 
crisis" (p. 213). Is Küng so sure these views are mutually exclusive? Did 
Jesus proclaim only world crisis? Are not all of them, in their real 
differences, complementary? Such questions demand further investiga-
tion. Finally, one of the central arguments used by Küng to establish the 
normativity of Christianity is its vision of a personal, loving God in 
contrast to the "impersonal divinity" of the East (cf., pp. 300-318). And 
here again, while these differences are real, they can be seen to be more 
complementary than exclusive or subordinated one to the other. Küng 
recognizes that there is abundant evidence in Eastern traditions that 
Deity has been experienced and spoken of as personal and loving, e.g., in 
Amida Budhism and especially in Bhakti Hinduism (not mentioned by 
Küng). Even more significantly, Küng admits the dangers of biblical 
anthropomorphism and concedes that Godhead is better conceived as 
"transpersonal or superpersonal" (p. 303). Is it not precisely here 
that Christian theology also can learn from the East? Hindu and 
Buddhist thinkers, while admitting the power of personal symbols 
applied to Brahman or Nirvana, have been much more conscious of the 
limitations of such symbolism. Might they be said to own a certain 
"superiority" over Christian thought in this regard? 
In any case, the data Küng assembles for establishing the absolute 
normativity of Christianity does not appear to be convincing. This brings 
us to the final hypothesis. 
III. Claims of Uniqueness Not Possible According to Norms 
of Theological and Historical-Critical Method 
A. According to the Revisionist Method of Theology 
At least in theory, Küng seems to agree for the most part with David 
Tracy's revisionist model for fundamental theology. This model invites 
the theologian to carry out a mutually clarifying and critical dialogue 
between the two sources of Christian theology: "the Christian fact" 
(scriptural texts and tradition) and "common human experience."21 Any 
cognitive claims made by the theologian must be based on both these 
sources. Küng states the same thing when he explains that his own 
theological method wants to avoid the extremes of "dialectical theol-
ogy" (i.e., neo-orthodoxy, based solely on God's Word) and "natural 
theology" (unduly emphasizing experience and reason [p. 83]). More 
clearly, he insists that faith statements cannot be grounded exclusively 
2lRlessed Rage for Order, pp. 43-56. 
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on the authority of the Bible (p. 84) but must find "verification" from 
"the horizon of experience of man and society" (p. 65). "The rules of the 
game in theological science are not in principle different from those of 
the other sciences" (p. 87). 
If this be true, then I do not see how it is possible, at the present 
moment, for Küng to claim that Christ holds a finality or normativity 
over other religions. In the present state of knowledge of and dialogue 
with world religions, the revisionist theologian simply does not have 
enough data from "human experience" to verify the claim that Christian-
ity is based on a revelation which surpasses and can "catalyze" all 
others. Better to follow the more scientifically reputable path of David 
Tracy who claims that for Christians Jesus is clearly the revealer of a 
decisive truth about God and human existence and that this truth has 
universal significance; but he cautions against concluding to the finality 
of this truth for other religions: 
For the fundamental theologian, to show that decisiveness—or, in 
the more classical terms, that "finality"—more historically would 
demand, I believe, a dialectical analysis of Christianity in relation-
ship to the other world religions: a task which would demand a 
full-fledged use of history of religions in fundamental theology and 
would, in the final analysis, prove a theological task whose success-
ful completion would require a complete Christian dogmatics... ,22 
Such a task has not yet been carried out either by Christian fundamental 
or dogmatic theologians. Whether it would yield a verification of 
Christ's finality is uncertain. In the light of the processive, ever incom-
plete character of reality and of the continued vitality of other religions, 
it would seem unlikely. And if this were so, the Christian theologian 
and/or believer would not, as indicated in our first hypothesis, need to 
feel threatened. 
B. According to the Historical-Critical Method of scriptural Analysis 
One of the hallmarks of Küng's Christology is its insistence on histor-
ical foundations; he labors admirably for a Christology "from below." He 
has little doubt that there is reliable historical data to construct the 
essence of Jesus' message and the impact it had on his followers. But he 
goes further. Throughout the book he makes claims that historically we 
can know the moral perfection of Jesus' life, how he actually lived, his 
sinlessness, his self-awareness. "We know incomparably more that is 
historically certain about Jesus of Nazareth than we do about the great 
founders of the Asian religions" (p. 147). He states that not only did Jesus 
reveal God's word and will but that in his "life, being and action" he was 
"Ibid., p. 234. 
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"God's word and will in human form" (p. 443). And he finds the distinc-
tive element in Christian ethics to be the "person" of Jesus as "the living, 
archetypal embodiment of his cause" (p. 545). It is also on the basis of 
such historical knowledge about the life of Jesus that he establishes his 
claim that Jesus was like no other man, that he is the norm for all others. 
Here a vigorous word of caution must be spoken. Numerous scholars, 
in view of the nature of the New Testament documents, point out the 
difficulty if not impossibility of such historical assertions. Tracy admits 
to " . . . the insuperable difficulties present in any attempt to reconstruct 
Jesus' own actualization of those possibilities (contained in his message) 
by either historical or modern philosophical methods."23 Dennis 
Nineham, in a challenging article in the recently published The Myth of 
God Incarnate, summarizes: 
The chief concern of this paper is to ensure as far as possible that 
those who continue to make such a claim for the uniqueness of Jesus 
and speak, for example, of "the new humanity," "the man wholly for 
others," or "the man wholly for God," are fully aware of the problems 
involved in making and justifying any such claims . . . it is impossi-
ble to justify any such claim on purely historical ground, however 
wide the net for evidence is cast.24 
Perhaps Maurice Wiles is correct in observing that many theologians 
who are "acutely aware of the intellectual difficulties in the basic affir-
mations of theism" are "naively credulous in their handling of the 
historical traditions about Jesus."25 
These considerations do not at all undermine the fact that the mes-
sage of Jesus, as contained and interpreted in the New Testament, is 
existentially reliable and decisive for Christians; nor do they deny that 
Jesus serves as a salvific symbol for the realization ofthat message. They 
do, however, indicate the probable impossibility of appealing to the way 
Jesus lived and concluding to his normative excellence over all other 
religious figures. 
C. According to Küng's Understanding of Incarnation 
While I find myself in basic agreement with Küng's interpretation or 
"re-mythologization" of the doctrine of incarnation, I do not think he is 
aware of its implications for his views on the finality of Christ. Küng 
holds that the manner in which the incarnation has been understood and 
"Ibid., p. 218. 
24
"Epilogue," op. cit. (in footnote 4), pp. 194-195. 
25The Remaking of Christian Doctrine (London: SCM, 1974), pp. I l l , cf., also pp. 
45-49. This is also one of the primary criticisms which Schubert Ogden makes of John 
Cobb's Christology: Ogden, "Christology Reconsidered: John Cobb's 'Christ in a Pluralistic 
Age,' " Process Studies 6 (1976), pp. 116-122. 
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then elevated as "the central dogma" of the faith detracts from the 
"center" of the Christian message (p. 436). This has led to a simplistic 
identification of Jesus with God and, contrary to Jesus' own preaching, 
has made him "an end in himself" (p. 391; pp. 286-287). Recognizing the 
importance of the titles given to Jesus for our own Christian experience, 
Küng warns against understanding these titles, especially those claim-
ing divinity, too literally or metaphysically (pp. 184-292; 390-392). They 
were attempts, he holds, to articulate an experience. Küng, therefore, 
opts for a functional Christology from below which stresses what Jesus 
did and does for humankind, rather than on ontological Christology 
from above, which insists on what his nature was and is, especially his 
préexistent nature (pp. 436-450, 390, 291). In reality, then, talk of incar-
nation and such divine titles as "Son of God" attempt to express the 
experience that Jesus was the "representative" and "the real revelation 
of the one true God" (pp. 390-391, 444). Incarnation means: "God him-
self as man's friend was present, at work, speaking, acting, and defini-
tively revealing himself in Jesus..." (p. 449). Küng lines up a more 
contemporary, re-mythologized list of titles: God's "advocate," "dep-
uty," "delegate," "spokesman," "plenipotentiary" (pp. 449, 440). 
There are, I would say, both theological and especially pastoral 
grounds for affirming such a functional interpretation of incarnation. 
Yet such an interpretation also places Christianity's traditional claims 
for Jesus' absolute uniqueness on shaky ground. If incarnation is no 
longer seen as a one-time descent of God to earth, if it is meant to express 
the people's experience of a man who was and/or became a true revealer 
and representative of God, then the question is unavoidable: have not 
others carried out essentially the same role? Can we not speak of other 
incarnations? At the most, the difference between Jesus and these others 
would be one of degree, not essence. But, such a difference of degree 
could not simply be claimed; it would have to be established through 
what Tracy called "dialectical analysis"26—which is possible only on 
the basis of encounter and dialogue with other religions.27 What has been 
26Cf. footnote 22. 
27
 Such a "dialogical Christology" which, while holding to the universal meaning of 
Jesus, does not approach other religions with α priori claims of exclusivist normativity is 
followed by a growing number of theologians. Gregory Baum, op. cit., in footnote 12. Id., 
"Introduction" to Rosemary Ruether's Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of 
Anti-Semitism (New York, Seabury, 1974). Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, pp. 204-236. 
John Hick, "Jesus and the World Religions," The Myth of God Incarnate, pp. 167-185. Id., 
God and the Universe of Faiths, pp. 108-179. Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theol­
ogy, pp. 246-193. Raymond Panikkar, "The Category of Growth in Comparative Religion: A 
Critical Self-Examination," The Harvard Theological Review 66 (1973), pp. 113-140. Id., 
Salvation in Christ: Concreteness and Universality (Santa Barbara, 1972, privately pub­
lished). Kohn Dunne, The Way of All the Earth (New York: Macmillan, 1972). 
In view of such understandings of the normativity of Christ, I think that Peter 
Schineller in his presentation of four "models" for contemporary articulations of the 
uniqueness of Christ (cf., footnote 6) should have added a fifth model. It would be inserted 
between models three and four and, following Schineller's terminology, could be called 
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said of Rahner's transcendental Christology can also be applied to 
Küng's functional Christology: "From this point of view the challenging 
question about the incarnation is not 'whether/ but'why only once'?"28 
Perhaps suspecting this, Küng offers a number of arguments to verify 
his claim that the revelation of God in Jesus surpasses, definitively and 
normatively, all others. But again, we can ask: are these arguments as 
convincing as he thinks?29 
(a) He states that in Jesus' words and deeds, the human situation was 
"fundamentally changed." In Jesus were opened "completely new pos-
sibilities, the possibility of new life and new freedom, of a new meaning 
in l ife. . . the freedom of love" (p. 265). I think anyone versed in com-
parative religions would have to ask: were not such fundamental 
changes and new possibilities presented, for example, in the life and 
message of Buddha, especially in his promise of liberation from the 
chain of rebirth (a symbol perhaps similar to that of "sin" or "the law") 
and in his call to live karuna, universal compassion? 
(b) Elsewhere Küng states that it is the cross which distinguishes 
Jesus from all others: "the ultimate distinctive feature of Christianity is 
quite literally according to Paul 'this Jesus Christ, Jesus Christ crucified.' 
It is not indeed as risen, exalted, living, divine, but as crucified, that this 
Jesus Christ is distinguished unmistakably from the many risen, exalted, 
living gods and deified founders of religion..." (p. 410). Küng's in-
terpretation of the meaning of the cross (pp. 428-436) is one of the most 
powerful sections of his book, but again one must ask him whether the 
doctrine of the cross is essentially different from similar insights in other 
religions. The symbol of the cross calls upon us to embrace, when 
necessary, the mystery of suffering and to believe that it leads to fuller 
life. While Buddha did not die on a gibbet, did he not invite his followers 
to take the risk of living a life of total anatta—no-self and to believe that 
it will lead to a higher form of existence, one of peace and oneness? And 
the call of the Bhagavad Gita to act without seeking the fruits of one's 
actions, is it not a call to a selfless life of trusting love? The crucifix is 
indeed one of the most powerful symbols with which to confront the 
mystery of suffering and evil; but it is not the only one.30 
(c) It is presumptuous to take up the question of the resurrection and 
Küng's interpretation of it in one short paragraph. Yet despite his 
"Theocentric Universe-Dialogically Normative Christology." It holds to the meaning and 
therefore normativity of Jesus for all peoples, but does not make this claim in an α priori 
fashion; it seeks to establish the normativity of Christ through dialogue, and, in dialogue, is 
open to the possibility of there being "other norms." 
"Otto Hentz, in a seminar paper read at the American Academy of Religion convention, 
1974. 
29
 We have already considered other arguments in hypothesis II: Jesus' view of God as 
personal and his proclamation of "world crisis." 
30This point is also made by William P. Loe we, "Lonergan and the Law of the Cross: A 
Universalist View of Salvation," Anglican Theological Review 59 (1977), pp. 162-174. 
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downplaying of the resurrection in our last quotation (p. 410), he does 
consider it a distinguishing element of Christ's revelation. He makes a 
theologically defensible case for his interpretation of the Easter event 
(pp. 370-381). Refusing to appeal to any kind of "supernatural interven-
tion," he views the resurrection not as an "objectified" or a "simple 
historical fact" but nevertheless as "real." Its reality does not necessarily 
depend upon belief in the empty tomb or even in certain appearances (p. 
371) but upon a "vocation received in faith"—avocation to "shape one's 
own life out of the effective power of the life of this Jesus as related in the 
Easter stories" (p. 380). In this sense, it is real; in this sense the Crucified 
is not dead but lives on. But given the validity of this interpretation (and I 
think it is valid), can we limit the reality behind the Easter stories only to 
an experience of Jesus? Is it not essentially what countless men and 
women have felt in their experience of other archetypal religious lead-
ers? Again, Buddha is an example. Although his followers certainly did 
not speak of resurrection—that was not a heuristic category in their 
thought-world—did they not experience a "vocation received in faith" 
after his death? It was not only a matter of recalling his message but 
experiencing "the power" ofthat message. This case can be pressed all 
the more meaningfully in later development of Mahayana when Buddha 
was deified and given a "glorified body" in the Trikaya doctrine. 
Such elements of the Christ event—cross, resurrection, personal 
God, call to love—are indeed distinguishing features of Christian revela-
tion and are therefore vitally important for all peoples of all time. Yet 
they are not lacking in other religions, though terminology and sym-
bolism differ. Thus the possibility of claiming absolute uniqueness for 
Jesus on such grounds appears highly questionable. 
The above criticisms of Küng's claim that Christ and Christianity are 
"essentially different" do not intend to take away from the overall merits 
of his book. It is, for both academic and popular audiences, one of the 
most valuable "Summas of the Christian Faith" (p. 20) to be published 
over the past decades. His case for the relevance of being a Christian in 
today's world is convincing. My criticism boils down to: it would be just 
as, if not more, convincing if he avoided such terms as: "only," "essen-
tially different," "normative." 
